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INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW AND PANDEMIC
TIMOTHY M. RAVICH*

ABSTRACT
Commercial airplanes are vectors of infectious disease, advancing, if not sparking, global epidemics and potentially
pandemics by exporting pathogens from endemic areas of the
world to non-endemic places. For example, according to the
global scientific community, the Zika virus was introduced to the
Americas by air travel. Researchers also believe that infected
mosquitos on international flights contributed to the worldwide
spread of malaria, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, and the
West Nile virus. Most recently, governmental authorities worldwide, in addition to issuing national or local shelter-in-place orders, closed their borders and grounded nearly all international
air travel on account of the COVID-19 virus. Such state action
raises interesting questions at the intersection of health care and
mobility. The severity of recent world events and their specific
relationship to international airline travel has generated substantial (albeit inconclusive) scientific literature about passenger-to-passenger and crew-to-passenger viral transmission in
commercial aviation. However, analysis of the corresponding legal risks for air carriers, if any, associated with the transmission
of infectious disease aboard aircraft are surprisingly
understudied.
This Article examines whether air carriers are or should be
liable under international law to passengers who contract infectious diseases aboard their aircraft. For example, in addition to
the obvious scenario of a passenger contracting an illness from
the air cabin environment, several other claims related to the
transmission of communicable diseases like COVID-19 are plausible in this regard. Passengers could conceivably sue an air carrier for failing to take certain precautions, such as warning
* Associate Professor and Chair (Interim), University of Central Florida,
Department of Legal Studies.
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passengers of the risk of contracting a disease. Alternatively, an
air carrier’s alleged failure to pre-screen or deny boarding to
passengers who exhibit symptoms of ill health may give rise to a
lawsuit. Not having or employing contract tracing protocols to
notify passengers of potential exposure might also support lawsuits against air carriers. Operational failures of high-efficiency
particulate absorbing (HEPA) filters, for instance, also theoretically may expose air carriers to liability, as may the failure of an
air carrier to comply with relevant international health regulations and guidance documents. Finally, passenger-plaintiffs
might succeed in convincing courts to award money damages
where the actions—or inactions—of an air carrier fail to safeguard the hygiene of aircraft cabins effectively.
The language, objectives, and drafting history of the Warsaw
Convention of 1929 and Montreal Convention of 1999 (Conventions) appear to broadly support a finding of liability against an
air carrier for the transmission of infectious disease in certain
circumstances. Still, the adjudication of claims under the Conventions likely will produce highly variable textual interpretations unmoored to any controlling legal precedent—in
contravention of the international aviation community’s goal of
uniformity. As such, this Article posits that even if the language,
policy, and existing case law related to the Conventions arguably
support a finding of liability, administrative and policy reasons
mitigate in favor of exonerating air carriers from claims seeking
damages arising from the transference of communicable diseases aboard aircraft in the international carriage.
In all, this Article’s relevance is greatest for aviation practitioners and courts adjudicating claims under the Conventions in
the context of COVID-19 or future global health care crises involving international aviation. That said, this Article may also
hold interest for a broader audience seeking to understand legal
and policy problems confronting global firms under private international law in post- and (perhaps) future-pandemic periods.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. LIABILITY UNDER THE WARSAW AND
MONTREAL CONVENTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. DEFINING “ACCIDENT” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. EXTERNALITIES AND CAUSATION UNDER AIR
FRANCE V. SAKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

587
592
595
597

2021]

AVIATION LAW & PANDEMIC

B. OLYMPIC AIRWAYS V. HUSAIN: INACTION AS
“ACCIDENT” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. FEAR OF CONTAGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. INFECTION AS AN EXPECTED, UNEXPECTED,
USUAL, AND UNUSUAL EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. ILLNESS AS A “PRODUCT OF A CHAIN
OF CAUSES” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. IS DISEASE AN INHERENT CHARACTERISTIC OF AIR
TRAVEL? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. DAMAGES AND DEFENSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.

587
601
604
608
608
612
615
618
620

INTRODUCTION

C

OMMERCIAL AIRPLANES ARE VECTORS of infectious
disease, advancing, if not sparking, global epidemics, and
potentially pandemics by exporting pathogens from endemic areas of the world to non-endemic places.1 For example, according to the global scientific community, the Zika virus was
introduced to the Americas by air travel.2 Researchers also believe that infected mosquitos on international flights contributed to the worldwide spread of malaria, Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome, and the West Nile virus.3 Most recently,
governmental authorities worldwide, in addition to issuing national or local shelter-in-place orders, closed their borders and
grounded nearly all international air travel on account of the
COVID-19 virus.4 They did so to stop the movement of symptomatic or asymptomatic people all around the globe.5 Such state
action raises interesting questions at the intersection of health
care and mobility. The severity of recent world events and their
specific relationship to international airline travel has generated
substantial (albeit inconclusive) scientific literature about pas1 Alexandra Mangili & Mark A. Gendreau, Transmission of Infectious Diseases
During Commercial Air Travel, 365 LANCET 989, 992 (2005) (“The aircraft as a vector for global spread of influenza strains is a greater concern than is in-flight
transmission.”).
2 See Nuno Rodrigues Faria et al., Zika Virus in the Americas: Early Epidemiological
and Genetic Findings, 352 SCIENCE 345, 346 (2016), https://www.science.org/doi/
epdf/10.1126/science.aaf5036 [https://perma.cc/93AS-DA3B].
3 See Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 1, at 993.
4 See generally INT’L AIR TRANS. ASS’N, AIR PASSENGER MARKET ANALYSIS 1 (Apr.
2020), https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/
air-passenger-monthly-analysis—-apr-20202/ [https://perma.cc/KCG7-BBCD].
5 See id.
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senger-to-passenger and crew-to-passenger viral transmission in
commercial aviation.6 However, analysis of the corresponding legal risks for air carriers, if any, associated with the transmission
of infectious disease aboard aircraft are surprisingly
understudied.7
This Article examines whether air carriers are or should be
liable to passengers who contract infectious diseases aboard
their aircraft under international law. In addition to the obvious
scenario of a passenger contracting an illness from the air cabin
environment, several other claims related to the transmission of
communicable diseases like COVID-19 are plausible in this regard. For example, passengers could conceivably sue an air carrier for failing to take certain precautions, such as warning
passengers of the risk of contracting a disease.8 Alternatively, an
air carrier’s alleged failure to pre-screen or deny boarding to
passengers who exhibit symptoms of ill health may give rise to a
lawsuit.9 Not having or employing contract tracing protocols to
notify passengers of potential exposure might also support lawsuits against air carriers.10 Operational failures of high-efficiency
particulate absorbing (HEPA) filters, for example, also theoretically may expose air carriers to liability, as may the failure of an
air carrier to comply with relevant international health regulations and guidance documents.11 Finally, passenger-plaintiffs
might succeed in convincing courts to award money damages
where the actions—or inactions—of an air carrier fail to safeguard the hygiene of aircraft cabins effectively.12
6 See Vicki Stover Hertzberg, Howard Weiss, Lisa Elon, Wenpei Si, Sharon L.
Norris & The FlyHealthy Research Team, Behaviors, Movements, and Transmission
of Droplet-Mediated Respiratory Diseases During Transcontinental Airline Flights, 115
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 3623, 3623 (2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/
pnas/115/14/3623.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS6E-F68M].
7 See, e.g., Kathryn Brown, Comment, Please Expect Turbulence: Liability for Communicable Disease Transmission During Air Travel, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 1081 (2017);
Allison M. Surcouf & Marissa N. Lefland, An Overview of Federal Law Governing the
Carriage of Passengers Who May Have a Communicable Disease on International Flights,
CONDON FORSYTH (Mar. 16, 2020), https://condonlaw.com/2020/03/an-overview-of-federal-law-governing-the-carriage-of-passengers-who-may-have-a-communicable-disease-on-international-flights/ [https://perma.cc/P9EC-92RM].
8 See Elaine D. Solomon & Christopher Cody Wilcoxson, Potential COVID-19
Liability Facing Air Carriers, BLANK ROME (Apr. 9, 2020), https://
www.blankrome.com/publications/potential-covid-19-liability-facing-air-carriers
[https://perma.cc/UH7X-LRKG].
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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However, proving any or all of these claims as a matter of law
is an altogether different exercise than conjuring up potential
causes of action in the abstract. Litigation arising from international air carriage is resolved pursuant to multilateral treaties:
the Warsaw Convention of 192913 and the Montreal Convention
of 1999 (collectively the Conventions).14 Though ostensibly supportive of a passenger’s right to obtain an appropriate monetary
award relative to damages provably sustained and caused by an
air carrier, the Conventions present significant evidentiary and
practical problems.15 Moreover, no court has applied the Conventions in the specific context of the transmission of infectious
disease aboard aircraft.16 While the language, objectives, and
drafting history of the Conventions broadly appear to support a
finding of liability against an air carrier for the transmission of
infectious disease in certain circumstances,17 the adjudication of
claims under the Conventions likely will produce highly variable
exercises of textual interpretation unmoored to any controlling
legal precedent. As such, this Article posits that even if the language, policy, and existing case law related to the Conventions
arguably support a finding of liability, administrative and policy
reasons mitigate in favor of exonerating air carriers from claims
seeking damages arising from the transference of communicable diseases aboard aircraft in the international carriage.
First, evaluating liability of an air carrier centers on the language in Article 17 of the Conventions: “[t]he carrier is liable
for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the
death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”18
13 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]; see infra Part II.
14 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, May 28, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-45, 2422 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter
Montreal Convention]; see infra Part II.
15 See Solomon & Wilcoxson, supra note 8.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 Warsaw Convention art. 17; Montreal Convention art. 17(1). The language
of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention are nearly the same
word-for-word, but where differences do exist (as they do in Article 17 of each
instrument), evidence suggests that the drafters intended similar treatment. See
Explanatory Note to Montreal Convention, art. 17, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-45,
1999 WL 33292734, at *16 (2000); see also Best v. BWIA W. Indies Airways Ltd.,
581 F. Supp. 2d 359, 362 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Because many of the provisions of
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Somewhat relative to national negligence regimes generally applicable to passenger related aircraft accidents, Article 17 establishes a “presumption” of air carrier liability for death or injuries
sustained on the aircraft.19 A fortiori, Article 17 provides an “essentially strict liability” regime for death or injury to international air passengers.20 As detailed in Part II of this Article, this
reflects a core policy of the drafters of the Conventions—to
guarantee passengers the prospect of relatively quick and inexpensive settlement.21
The burden of proof under the Conventions is not insignificant, notwithstanding their provisions in favor of airline passengers and their allowance for the recovery of damages in
warranted circumstances. Not only must passenger-plaintiffs establish a recognized loss (“damage sustained”) like death “or
any other bodily injury,” but they also must demonstrate that an
“accident” happened, where it occurred (“on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking”), and whether its occurrence was the cause of the
damages alleged.22 Though seemingly uncomplicated matters
on their face, these details are elusive and often vigorously contested by litigants. Strikingly, for instance, neither Convention
defines the word “accident.”23 In the absence of a uniform or
controlling definition, courts have offered fluid and sometimes
irreconcilable interpretations of the term as applied to claims
arising under the Conventions. The critical phrase “embarking
or disembarking” is also indefinite.24 Consequently, applying the
Conventions to traditional claims arising out of the operation of
an aircraft is a litigious process from the perspective of courts,
air carriers (and their insurers), aviation counsel, and clients—a
fact that portends interpretative and evidentiary complications
in unprecedented matters relating to the question of whether
the Montreal Convention are taken directly from the Warsaw Convention and the
many amendments thereto, the case law regarding a particular provision of the
Warsaw treaty applies with equal force regarding its counterpart in the Montreal
treaty.”).
19 In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol., on Mar. 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85, 87
(2d Cir. 1983).
20 Id. at 88.
21 See Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances Under the
Warsaw Convention, 16 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 891, 899–902, 963–64 (2001).
22 Id. at 902, 912.
23 Id. at 920.
24 Cf. id. at 932–33.
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the transmission of infectious disease falls within the scope of
Article 17.
Nevertheless, defining critical terms under the Conventions
and understanding the contours of liability of air carriers in the
“new normal” of post-COVID-19 pandemic international travel
is imperative given the heightened possibility that health crises
impact the global aviation industry with greater frequency than
has historically occurred. Therefore, this Article evaluates key
terms under Article 17 of the Conventions respecting air carrier
liability for death and injury to passengers arising from the
transmission of infectious disease and explains why the passenger-to-passenger or crew-to-passenger spread of communicable
disease like the novel coronavirus may (but perhaps should not)
constitute an “accident” to sustain a finding of air carrier
liability.
This Article proceeds in four parts to support this claim. Part
II briefly sets out the Conventions’ history to establish the purposes and policies underlying their text, especially Article 17.
Part III then analyzes how and whether the Conventions apply
to claims arising from the alleged transmission of communicable diseases aboard aircraft. In doing so, Part III presents and
examines the current framework for assessing the Conventions’
language to support air carrier liability. An appraisal of the defenses available to carriers is also offered, along with an evaluation of an especially controversial aspect of air carrier liability
under the Conventions: whether psychic injuries associated with
the risk of infection aboard an aircraft are compensable. Part IV
then applies existing precedent to demonstrate how courts may
find air carriers liable for infectious disease transmission, but
why they should not. Finally, Part V offers concluding remarks
in defense of a legal regime that affords passengers no remedy
in the specific context of disease aboard aircraft.
In all, this Article’s relevance is greatest for aviation practitioners and courts adjudicating claims under the Conventions in
the context of COVID-19 or future global health care crises involving international aviation. That said, this Article may also
hold interest for a broader audience seeking to understand legal
and policy problems confronting global firms under private international law in post- and (perhaps) future-pandemic periods.
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LIABILITY UNDER THE WARSAW AND MONTREAL
CONVENTIONS

Before assessing the relevant language of the Conventions,
this Part contextualizes each treaty by tracing it back to its origins a century ago. Doing so establishes the specific key concepts
undergirding the larger concept of air carrier liability in international air carriage. Furthermore, identifying the policy objectives of the Conventions brings into focus the unique features of
each instrument relative to traditional national tort law schemes
that may apply to other mass transportation modalities. Indeed,
the precise question of whether air carriers should (or should
not, as this Article claims) be liable for the transmission of infectious disease is influenced and informed by the historical purpose that gave rise to each of the Conventions.
The history of the Conventions dates back to the 1920s.25
Charles Lindbergh’s famous solo flight in 1927 of his “Spirit of
St. Louis” from New York to Paris hailed the inevitability of mass
international air travel.26 But “substantial perils of all kinds were
envisioned” and “capital was difficult to secure for this infant
industry, because of the risks of loss attendant upon unlimited
tort liability.”27 Therefore, just two years after Lindbergh’s pioneering accomplishment, a French-led diplomatic effort concluded a formal treaty—the Warsaw Convention—to establish a
legal regime relating to the issue of liability in the international
carriage by air.28
A central challenge for Warsaw Convention delegates was
meeting an emerging global need for a uniform set of rules that
spurred the early commercial aviation industry without leaving
remediless passengers killed or injured in airplane accidents.29
An early draft of the Warsaw Convention included a vast liability
provision holding carriers “liable for accidents, losses, breakdowns, and delays” whether or not death or bodily injury resulted.30 This formulation reflected the attitude of many early
twentieth-century national laws that regarded manned flight as
an insufficiently safe or proven mode of transportation—an “ul25 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
aff’d, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 See generally William B. Wright, The Warsaw Convention’s Damages Limitations, 6
CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 290, 290 (1957).
29 See id. at 292.
30 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 401 (1985).
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trahazardous activity” that involved risks of serious harm to persons that could not be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost
care.31
The authors of the Warsaw Convention ultimately prioritized
industry growth, or as the U.S. Supreme Court noted, the parties to the Warsaw Convention had the “primary purpose of . . .
limiting the liability of air carriers in order to foster the growth
of the fledgling commercial aviation industry.”32 Stated otherwise, “[i]n 1929 the parties were more concerned with protecting air carriers and fostering a new industry than providing a
full recovery to injured passengers . . . .”33 Thus, while the final
text of the Warsaw Convention countenanced air carrier liability
without proof of fault, it did so only to a finite point, by establishing a ceiling on damages—a cap—of a mere 125,000 gold
Francs per passengers (equivalent to approximately U.S. $8,300
in 1929).34 In addition, an air carrier could exonerate itself of
any liability under the Warsaw Convention upon a showing of
due care and that “all necessary measures to avoid the damage
[were taken] or that it was impossible” to do so.35 Passengerplaintiffs, meanwhile, would not be subject to the liability cap
under the Warsaw Convention if the damages resulted from an
air carrier’s “wilful misconduct,” a very high hurdle to overcome
as airlines were not (and still are not) in the business of injuring
or killing their customers or crew (or damaging their airplanes)
on purpose.36
The Warsaw Convention was controversial from its inception,
given the low maximum amount of damages available to passengers under its terms.37 In fact, just a year after the Warsaw Convention entered into force in 1933, the United States advocated
for its modernization and recalculation of what some described
as the “unconscionably low” liability limits of the Warsaw Convention.38 Initial U.S. efforts to increase the damages limit to
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. L. INST. 1938); see id. cmt. f.
E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991).
33 Id.
34 Id. (citing Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States
and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498–99 (1967)).
35 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 20(1).
36 Id. art. 25(1). But see In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988,
37 F.3d 804, 811–12 (2d Cir. 1994) (appeal from special verdict finding airline
liable for willful misconduct as “a substantial factor in causing” the bombing of
one its aircraft by terrorists).
37 See Wright, supra note 28, at 296.
38 See id.; S. EXEC. REP. 108-8, at 14 (2003).
31
32
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approximately $25,000 were not successful. However, during the
1950s, when the United States began to threaten denunciation
of the Warsaw Convention, an agreement was reached to increase the personal liability limits—but only to double what the
treaty originally allowed ($16,600).39
In 1999, member states of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted the Montreal Convention to replace
the Warsaw Convention.40 Despite its status among practitioners
as a comprehensive attempt to modernize and consolidate its
predecessor, the Montreal Convention is nearly identical, wordfor-word, to the Warsaw Convention, and in fact, court decisions
interpreting the Warsaw Convention apply to and have precedential value to lawsuits based on the Montreal Convention.41
But, with respect to liability, the Montreal Convention diverges from the Warsaw Convention in material and consequential ways. Among the most important differences between
the Conventions was the establishment of a two-tier liability system under the Montreal Convention.42 More specifically, in contrast to the distinguishing features of the Warsaw Convention
(i.e., presumed fault and a liability cap undone by proof of “wilful misconduct”), the Montreal Convention presented a strict
liability scheme in two dimensions.43 In the first tier of liability
under the Montreal Convention, air carriers are strictly, or absolutely, liable to passengers for death and injury up to “100,000
Special Drawing Rights,” which was equal to approximately
$134,484 on May 28, 1999, the date the Montreal Convention
was signed.44 Beyond that amount, under a second tier of liability under the Montreal Convention, air carriers are presumptively liable to an unlimited amount (i.e., no cap) unless the
defendant-carrier can prove either that “such damage was not
due to the negligence or other wrongful act of omission of the
39 Lee S. Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. &
COM. 291, 291, 295 (1965).
40 Milestones in International Civil Aviation, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., https://
www.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/Milestones-in-International-Civil-Aviation.aspx [https://perma.cc/B3PP-WBTV].
41 See Explanatory Note to Montreal Convention, art. 17, S. TREATY DOC. No.
106-45, 1999 WL 33292734, at *16 (2000); see also Best v. BWIA W. Indies Airways
Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 359, 362 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
42 Montreal Convention, supra note 14, arts. 17(1), 21.
43 Id.
44 Id. arts. 17(1), 21, 23(1); SDR Valuation, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://
www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx [https://perma.cc/5MFKJM8W] (choose “May,” “28,” and “1999”; then click “go”).
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carrier or its servants or agents,” or that “such damage was solely
due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a
third party.”45
Thus, where the Warsaw Convention minimized air carrier liability for the putative purpose of fostering the growth of the nascent international airline industry,46 the Montreal Convention is
comparatively more favorable to passengers, reflecting the maturity of the international commercial aviation industry and representing a sort of quid pro quo whereby passengers could
recover damages irrespective of negligence in exchange for a
limitation on carrier liability.47 As detailed in Part III, however,
the path to recovery is not only challenging for Warsaw Convention and Montreal Convention claimants as a general matter,
but is also likely to present unique problems of proof and persuasion for litigants asserting (or defending against) claims that
the transmission or contraction of infectious disease is compensable under either of the Conventions.
III.

DEFINING “ACCIDENT”

Pursuant to the 1950s-era Convention on International Civil
Aviation (Chicago Convention), coordination of certain operational aspects of international travel, including airspace, aircraft
registration, safety, and even health, fall under the jurisdiction
of the ICAO, a specialized agency of the United Nations.48 Notably, Article 14 of the Chicago Convention provides specific guidance for infectious disease mitigation efforts in international
aviation:
Each contracting State agrees to take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of cholera, typhus (epidemic), smallpox, yellow fever, plague, and such other
communicable diseases as the contracting States shall from time
to time decide to designate, and to that end contracting States
will keep in close consultation with the agencies concerned with
45 Montreal Convention, supra note 14, arts. 21(2); see also id. art. 29
(“[P]unitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages” are not
recoverable).
46 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, International Air Carrier Liability for Death & Personal Injury: To Infinity and Beyond 7 (2017), https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/files/
iasl/intl_air_carrier_liability_-_long_version_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L42Y35NY].
47 See Montreal Convention, supra note 14, arts. 17(1), 21.
48 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Convention on International Civil Aviation, at
6, 17, ICAO Doc. 7300/7 (7th ed. 1997), https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_7ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DTT-FZNS].
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international regulations relating to sanitary measures applicable
to aircraft. Such consultation shall be without prejudice to the
application of any existing international convention on this subject to which the contracting States may be parties.49

Under the authority of this provision, ICAO frequently collaborates with the International Air Transport Association (IATA),
the trade association for the world’s airlines responsible for setting industry technical standards.50 For example, IATA and
ICAO work with the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide health-related recommendations for air carriers.51
However, this work often runs into significant headwinds in
national laws and policies that allow for the discretionary adoption of international controls.52 Consequently, infectious disease
control measures are often diluted, as exemplified by the fact
that International Health Regulations express only one provision relating to air travel, requiring a pilot in command to
merely provide a brief aircraft general declaration of passenger
health to ground staff before disembarkation.53
What is more, by its terms, the Chicago Convention applies to
“contracting States,” not explicitly to private entities, like air carriers.54 Therefore, while the health objectives of the Chicago
Convention could protect passengers from certain risks, the Chicago Convention creates no rights for passengers with claims
against air carriers emanating from the transmission of infectious or communicable diseases.55 For that matter, the absence
of controlling or cohesive international rules or legally binding
regulations respecting the transmission of infectious disease
Id. at 6.
About Us, IATA, https://www.iata.org/en/about/ [https://perma.cc/ZX7ZJZ79].
51 See generally Courtney Clegg, Comment, The Aviation Industry and the Transmission of Communicable Disease: The Case of H1N1 Swine Influenza, 75 J. AIR L. &
COM. 437 (2010).
52 For example, national laws in Australia and New Zealand require usage of
insecticides in commercial aviation operations whereas the United States does
not. Andrea Grout, Natasha Howard, Richard Coker & Elizabeth M. Speakman,
Guidelines, Law, and Governance: Disconnects in the Global Control of Airline-Associated
Infectious Diseases, 17 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES e118, e119 (2017) (“National
guidance and legislation are uncoordinated across countries, and—with no
strong evidence underpinning control measures—they are often inconsistent.”).
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], supra note 48, at 2 (“The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory.”).
55 Grout, Howard, Coker & Speakman, supra note 52, at e120.
49
50
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aboard aircraft means that passengers cannot present a court
with evidence of a per se violation by an air carrier that may
translate into liability under the Conventions. Even if such evidence existed, the Conventions do not explicitly require a finding of liability if an air carrier deviates from or violates
regulations or policies issued be national or international aviation or health care authorities (though they likely would be interpreted as doing so).56
In any case, the Conventions require that private claimants
assert their claims on a case-by-case basis for each accident.57
Complicating this process is the fact that the Conventions lack
explicit or uniform definitions of key terms and phrases.58 Consequently, many issues arising under the Conventions—and the
specific question here of whether a passenger’s contraction of
COVID-19 or any other infectious disease aboard an aircraft supports a finding of liability under the Conventions—involve “line
drawing” exercises that produce variable conclusions rather
than fixed principles about legal matters that are very often matters of first impression. Nevertheless, as detailed below, the existing body of precedent broadly suggests that lawsuits against
air carriers under the relevant international treaties connected
to the transmission of communicable diseases could be successful on average—and perhaps more successful than they should
be as a normative matter or would be under traditional negligence schema.
A.

EXTERNALITIES

AND

CAUSATION UNDER AIR FRANCE V. SAKS

Article 17 of the Conventions imposes strict liability on an air
carrier “for damage sustained in the event of death,” “wounding
of a passenger,” or “any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger.”59 This liability is imposed only on the condition that the
alleged damage takes place either “on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”60 No court has held that an infectious disease constitutes
“wounding” or “bodily injury” under the Conventions.61 ThereSee infra Part III.A, Part III.B.
See generally Solomon & Wilcoxson, supra note 8.
58 See id.
59 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 17; see also Montreal Convention,
supra note 14, art. 17(1).
60 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 17; Montreal Convention, supra note
14, art. 17(1).
61 See Solomon & Wilcoxson, supra note 8.
56
57
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fore, as with nearly every other personal injury claim arising
under the Conventions, litigation arising from the transmission
of infectious disease aboard aircraft in the international carriage
will center on competing constructions of the word “accident.”62
That is particularly problematic for claimants asserting personal
injury claims related to the transmission of infectious diseases
under the Conventions because neither treaty defines the word
“accident” or other key terms around which adjudication of liability strictly depends.63 This is remarkably unhelpful as the occurrence of an “accident” is the “essential predicate of carrier
liability . . . .”64 Nevertheless, what is known is that courts that
have construed the word “accident” in Article 17 have done so
by focusing on causation.65
According to the seminal case of Air France v. Saks, a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court authored by Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, liability under the terms of Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention “arises only if a passenger’s injury is caused
by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.”66 To reach this conclusion, the Saks Court
looked to the text of the convention, along with the negotiation
history of the convention, the conduct of the parties to the convention, and the weight of precedent in foreign and American
courts.67
First, the Saks court reasoned that “the text of Article 17 refers
to an accident which caused the passenger’s injury, and not to an
accident which is the passenger’s injury.”68 The Court drew this
conclusion by noting an intentional distinction in the Warsaw
Convention between liability for injuries to passengers caused by
an “accident” (under Article 17) and liability imposed for destruction or loss of baggage caused by an “occurrence” (under
Article 18).69 The difference in the parallel language of Articles
17 and 18 “implies that the drafters of the [Warsaw] Convention
understood the word ‘accident’ to mean something different
than the word ‘occurrence.’ ”70
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

See id.
Id.
Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2000).
See, e.g., id. at 297–300.
470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id.
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The Saks Court also reasoned that the drafters of the Warsaw
Convention distinguished “the cause and the effect” by specifying that “air carriers would be liable if an accident caused the
passenger’s injury.”71 In this regard, the Saks Court read the text
of the treaty to imply that it is “the cause of the injury that must
satisfy the definition [of accident] rather than the occurrence of
the injury alone.”72 Citing an English tort law case, moreover,
the Saks Court highlighted that this interpretation harmonized
with American jurisprudence, which had long recognized a distinction between an accident that is the cause of an injury and
injury that is the accident itself:
The word ‘accident’ is not a technical legal term with a clearly
defined meaning. Speaking generally, but with reference to legal
liabilities, an accident means any unintended and unexpected
occurrence which produces hurt or loss. But it is often used to
denote any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from
its cause; and if the cause is not known the loss or hurt itself
would certainly be called an accident. The word ‘accident’ is also
often used to denote both the cause and the effect, no attempt
being made to discriminate between them.73

Next, in the absence of a formal definition of the word “accident,” the Saks Court looked to the French legal meaning of the
word “accident.”74 As the Court explained, examination of the
French legal meaning was important “not because ‘we are forever chained to French law’ by the Convention, . . . but because
it is our responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a
meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties [who were continental jurists].”75 In this context,
the Saks Court observed “[a] survey of French cases and dictionaries indicates that the French legal meaning of the term ‘accident’ differs little from the meaning of the term in Great
Britain, Germany, or the United States.”76 Thus: “While the
word “accident” is often used to refer to the event of a person’s
injury, it is also sometimes used to describe a cause of injury, and
Id. at 398–99.
Id. at 399 (“American jurisprudence has long recognized this distinction between an accident that is the cause of an injury and an injury that is itself an
accident.”).
73 Id. at 398 (quoting Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co., [1903] A.C. 443, 453).
74 Id. at 398–400.
75 Id. at 399 (citation omitted) (“We look to the French legal meaning for
guidance as to these expectations because the Warsaw Convention was drafted in
French by continental jurists.”).
76 Id. at 399.
71
72
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when the word is used in this latter sense, it is usually defined as
a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended event.”77
Therefore, the Court reasoned that the language of Article 17
“suggests that the passenger’s injury must be caused by an unexpected or unusual event.”78
The Saks Court also went beyond the text of Article 17 to divine the meaning of “accident,” exploring the records of negotiation of the Warsaw Convention.79 While those materials also
offered no precise definition of “accident,” they further evidenced an understanding of the word “accident” as meaning
something different than an occurrence on the plane, according to the Court.80 For example, representatives of many of the
Warsaw Convention signatories at an International Conference
on Air Law in Guatemala City in 1971 worked to approve an
amendment to Article 17 that would have imposed liability on
an air “carrier for an ‘event which caused the death or injury’
rather than for an ‘accident which caused’ the passenger’s injury.”81 This proposed provision would have exempted an air
carrier from liability if the death or injury resulted “solely from
the state of health of the passenger.”82
Finally, the Saks Court found that the weight of precedent in
foreign and American courts supported the conclusion that an
unexpected or unusual event must cause a passenger’s injury.83
For example, “in Air France v. Haddad, Judgment of June 19,
1979 . . . a French court observed that the term ‘accident’ in
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention embraces causes of injuries
that are fortuitous or unpredictable.”84 Moreover, the Court
took notice of the fact that “European legal scholars have generally construed the word ‘accident’ in Article 17 to require that
the passenger’s injury be caused by a sudden or unexpected
77 Id. at 399–400 (footnote omitted); see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 34, at 500.
78 Saks, 470 U.S. at 400.
79 Id. (“In interpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to refer to the records of
its drafting and negotiation.”) (citing Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943)).
80 Id. at 403.
81 Id.
82 Id. (citing Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], 2 Documents of the International
Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City, ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-2, at 189 (1972)).
83 Id. at 404–05.
84 Id. at 404 (citing Cour d’appel de Paris, Première Chambre Civile, 1979 Revue Francaise de Droit Aerien, at 328).
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event other than the normal operation of the plane.”85 Similarly, American judges construing the word “accident” had “refuse[d] to extend the term to cover routine travel procedures
that produce[d] an injury due to the peculiar internal condition
of a passenger.”86
In all, Saks stands for the proposition that liability under Article 17 “arises only if a passenger’s injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger.”87 Stated otherwise, “when [an] injury indisputably
results from [a] passenger’s own internal reaction to the usual,
normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, it has not been
caused by an accident and Article 17 . . . cannot apply.”88 In
application, this judicially crafted definition of “accident” under
Saks, standing alone, has proved to be both complicated and insufficient to resolve liability questions under the Conventions.
This is because, among other reasons detailed in Part III.B, determining which “event” should be the focus of the “accident”
frequently is an issue unto itself.
B.

OLYMPIC AIRWAYS V. HUSAIN: INACTION

AS

“ACCIDENT”

In Olympic Airways v. Husain, the Supreme Court relied on
Saks to decide whether an air carrier’s conduct was unusual and
unexpected, and thus a link in the causal chain leading to an
“accident.”89 There, a passenger, Dr. Abid Hanson (who had
asthma), asked three separate times to be reseated away from
the smoking section of the aircraft.90 A flight attendant twice
declined.91 Once the plane was in the air and other passengers
had started smoking, the flight attendant invited him to walk
around the cabin in search of someone willing to switch seats.92
However, as the smoking noticeably increased in the rows beId. (citing O. RIESE & J. LACOUR, PRECIS DE DROIT AERIEN 264 (1951) (noting
that Swiss and German law require that the damage be caused by an accident,
and arguing that an accident should be construed as an event which is sudden
and independent of the will of the carrier); 1 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR
LAW ¶ VII (148) (4th ed. 1984) (noting that the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit’s definition of accident accords with some English definitions and “might
well commend itself to an English court”).).
86 Id. at 405.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 406.
89 540 U.S. 644, 655–56 (2004).
90 Id. at 647.
91 Id.
92 Id.
85
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hind him, Dr. Hanson became ill, required CPR and oxygen,
and ultimately died.93 His widow, Rubina Husain, sued the air
carrier for wrongful death, averring that the “unexpected or unusual event or happening” that constituted an “accident” within
the meaning of Article 17 was not Dr. Hanson’s death but the
airline’s refusal to reseat him.94 She prevailed at the trial court
level and again on the air carrier’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.95 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.96
In an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “the ‘accident’ condition
precedent to air carrier liability under Article 17” as set forth in
Saks was “satisfied when the carrier’s unusual and unexpected
refusal to assist a passenger [was] a link in a chain of causation
resulting in a passenger’s pre-existing medical condition being
aggravated by exposure to a normal condition in the aircraft
cabin.”97 Notably, in reaching this conclusion, the Husain majority reasoned that an airline’s mere inaction could constitute an
“accident” and would suffice as a basis of liability even among
other potential “injury producing events.”98 Framing the issue
before it in this way, the Court rejected the contention that a
flight attendant’s conduct could only constitute an “accident” if
it were an affirmative act.99 The Husain court disagreed, reasoning that the distinction between action and inaction would perhaps be relevant in a tort law negligence case but that a
negligence regime does not apply under Article 17 of the Convention.100 “The relevant ‘accident’ inquiry under Saks is
whether there is ‘an unexpected or unusual event or
happening.’ ”101
In a dissent joined by Justice O’Connor (author of the unanimous Saks decision), Justice Antonin Scalia rejected the majority’s view that the word “accident” under the Warsaw
Convention could encompass inaction (i.e., the flight attendant’s failure to reseat Dr. Hanson).102 First and foremost, according to the dissenting opinion, the majority’s conclusion
Id. at 648.
Id. at 648, 651.
95 Id. at 648.
96 Id. at 649.
97 Id. at 646.
98 Id. at 653–54.
99 Id. at 654.
100 Id. at 654–55.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 658–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93
94
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placed U.S. law in conflict with the view of other signatories to
the treaty.103 For example, after analyzing more than a halfdozen non-English decisions, England’s Court of Appeal held
that inaction could not be described as an accident because it “is
not an event; it is a non-event. Inaction is the antithesis of an
accident.”104 The Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia, likewise
considered American and other foreign decisions to conclude
that “it is not the failure to take the step which is properly to be
characterised as an accident but rather its immediate and disastrous consequence.”105
The dissent further criticized the majority’s opinion as outcome-determinative, fashioning a remedy to a terrible tragedy
instead of applying the convention by its terms, regardless of the
potentially harsh result that might obtain.106 As Justice Scalia
wrote:
The Convention denies a remedy, even when outrageous conduct and grievous injury have occurred, unless there has been an
“accident.” Whatever that term means, it certainly does not
equate to “outrageous conduct that causes grievous injury.” It is a
mistake to assume that the Convention must provide relief whenever traditional tort law would do so. To the contrary, a principal
object of the Convention was to promote the growth of the
fledgling airline industry by limiting the circumstances under
which passengers could sue. . . . Unless there has been an accident, there is no liability, whether the claim is trivial . . . or cries
out for redress.107

Finally, the dissent highlighted a factual dispute that recommended remanding rather than affirming the appellate court’s
decision that a flight attendant’s unexpected and unusual conduct in refusing three times to move an asthmatic passenger to
another seat away from the smoking section of the airplane constituted an “accident” within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention.108 Specifically, the flight attendant invited Dr. Hanson
to find another passenger willing to switch seats with him; she
103 Id. at 660 (“We can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories when
we interpret treaty provisions. Foreign constructions are evidence of the original
shared understanding of the contracting parties.”).
104 Id. 659–60 (citing Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation,
[2004], Q.B. 234).
105 Id. at 660 (quoting Qantas Ltd. v. Povey, [2003] VSCA 227, ¶ 17, 2003 WL
23000692 (Dec. 23, 2003) (Ormiston, J. A.)).
106 See id. at 664.
107 Id. (citations omitted).
108 Id. at 666–67.
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did not invite him to find an empty seat.109 To the contrary, she
affirmatively represented that the airplane was full—which was
not the case.110 In this context, Justice Scalia reasoned that a
cause of action might lie if such a misrepresentation was unusual and unexpected and if it can be reasonably said that it
caused Dr. Hanson’s death.111
Taking Saks and Husain together, the Conventions theoretically could encompass claims arising from the transmission of
infectious diseases. To be successful, claimants must demonstrate an unusual or unexpected externality and apparently also
can prosecute air carriers for inaction, including by failing to
take preventative action to mitigate the risk of infection. As detailed in Part IV, however, the evidentiary burdens and administrative costs involved in such litigation, together with the text,
purpose, and policy of the Conventions, suggests that air carriers should not be liable to international passengers for the transmission of infectious diseases, the risks of which passengers
themselves are well positioned (or best positioned related to air
carriers) to avoid or eliminate.
C.

FEAR

OF

CONTAGION

Not to be lost in the enduring debate about what constitutes
an “accident” is a relatively new controversy—whether psychic
damages are recoverable under the Conventions. In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, a case arising under the Warsaw Convention,
the Supreme Court addressed “the question whether Article 17
allows recovery for mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied by
physical injury or physical manifestation of injury.”112 The Court
determined that Article 17 did not so provide, stating: “an air
carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an accident
has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or
physical manifestation of injury.”113 This left unresolved the
question of whether a mental injury standing alone was recoverable under the Warsaw Convention, an inquiry left unanswered
by the Floyd court, which expressed “no view as to whether passengers can recover for mental injuries that are accompanied by
physical injuries.”114
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.

at 666.
at 666–67.
499 U.S. 530, 532–33 (1991).
at 552.
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However, in 2017, in Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., a case arising under the Montreal Convention, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals departed from nearly a century of jurisprudence on this
issue, opening the door to the recovery of damages in cases arising from the transmission and contraction of infectious aboard
international aircraft.115
The facts of Etihad Airways are cringeworthy, perhaps explaining the court’s willingness to find a remedy in the same way the
Supreme Court in Husain labored to explain the existence of a
remedy in the aftermath of a terrible tragedy. In Etihad Airways,
a passenger traveling from the Middle East to the United States
had a tray table open in her lap because the knob that was
meant to hold it in place had fallen to the floor.116 On the descent, a flight attendant reminded the passenger to place her
tray table in the upright and locked position for landing, but, of
course, she could not comply.117 To help explain the problem to
the flight attendant, the passenger “reached into the seatback
pocket to retrieve the fallen knob” and was “unexpectedly
pricked by a hypodermic needle that lay hidden within.”118 “She
gasped, and the needle drew blood from her finger.”119 Ultimately, she “claim[ed] damages from Etihad for both her physical injury and her ‘mental distress, shock, mortification, sickness
and illness, outrage and embarrassment from natural sequela of
possible exposure to’ various diseases.”120 “Her husband
claim[ed] loss of consortium.”121
In defense, the air carrier argued that a passenger seeking to
recover damages for mental anguish would first have to prove
that an accident caused bodily injury, which in turn caused the
mental anguish.122 Finding no support for this understanding in
either the history and purpose of the Montreal Convention or
the relevant decisions of courts of the United States or sister
signatories, the court reasoned that air carriers are liable if passengers prove “fear of contagion or other mental anguish” and
that this was so “regardless of whether the anguish was directly
115 870 F.3d 406, 436 (6th Cir. 2017); see David M. Krueger, Mental Distress for
Airline Lawyers: The Sixth Circuit’s Decision in Doe v. Etihad, 31 AIR & SPACE LAW 4,
4 (2018).
116 Etihad Airways, 870 F.3d at 409.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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caused by the physical hole in [the passenger’s] finger or by the
fact that [the passenger] was pricked by a needle.”123 The court
illustrated its understanding of the word “accident” in the Montreal Convention in terms of parallel tracks of liability flowing
from a single “accident,” as follows:

124

Additionally, the court offered a hypothetical example in support of its conclusion:
Consider a case in which an overhead bin unexpectedly opens in
flight, causing a suitcase to fall out and strike a passenger in the
eye. The passenger might sustain bodily injury—bruises, broken
or fractured bones, a concussion, etc.—and the passenger might
sustain mental anguish such as the fear of losing sight in the injured eye or a fear of being struck by flying objects. The “accident” would be the suitcase striking the passenger (The faulty
overhead bin or latch, like the airline’s failure to clean out the
seatback pocket in Doe’s case, might be underlying negligence
that precipitated the accident.) The accident happened on
board the aircraft. And the accident caused bodily injury. Thus,
the carrier would be liable for the passenger’s damage sustained
as the result of being struck by the suitcase—including such
mental anguish as fear of losing sight, even if the passenger ultimately did not suffer a loss of vision, and even if the fear of losing
sight was not caused directly by a bodily injury.125

Whether this example supplied by the court and the broader
holding of Etihad Airways will persuade courts outside of the
Sixth Circuit to allow hard-to-verify claims of mental anguish is
both unclear and concerning.
In the context of a public health crisis such as the COVID-19
pandemic, Etihad Airways has, to an extraordinary extent, low123
124
125

Id. at 430–34.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 433–34.
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ered the burden of proof for passengers and widened the scope
of potential liability for air carriers under the Montreal Convention.126 For starters, imaginative plaintiffs’ lawyers seemingly can
pursue worked-up mental anguish claims “even if the passenger
ultimately did not suffer a loss,”127 begging the question of
whether every airline passenger that ever flies is a potential
claimant. After all, what passenger would not be concerned that
an infection contracted aboard an aircraft is not something
more serious and potentially fatal? In all, the rationale of Etihad
Airways seems to breathe life into psychic injury claims by passengers who experience bodily injury by contracting an illness—
even if they contract something less serious than COVID-19 type
illnesses.128 Apparently, all a passenger-plaintiff must do is come
forward with evidence that they were worried and consequently
limited their regular personal and professional activities out of a
subjective (and not altogether unreasonable) fear.
While no court has (yet) confronted this issue of psychic damages relative to the transmission of infectious diseases aboard
aircraft, real-world examples are not hard to imagine. For example, a passenger died due to COVID-19 on a domestic United
Airlines flight in 2020.129 Could an international passenger
onboard successfully have sued for psychological or emotional
damages under the precedent of Etihad Airways claiming that
the airline was negligent in its pre-flight screening? The answer,
of course, turns on judicial construction and interpretation of
the international treaties applicable to the international carriage—an activity that itself depends on and will vary by jurisdiction. The likelihood that different appellate courts will arrive at
different results risks contravening the goal of uniformity under
both Conventions. What is more, in deciding cases averring
psychic injury associated with an infectious disease on aircraft,
While questions under the Montreal Convention are unsettled, the issue of
whether a passenger may recover for purely emotions injuries under the Warsaw
Convention appears closed, including with respect to claims arising from fear of
contagion. See, e.g., Rothschild v. Tower Air, Inc., No. CIV. A. 94-2656, 1995 WL
71053, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995) (“The law is clear that a plaintiff must show
exposure to a disease in order to recover for fear of contracting the disease.”)
(case with similar facts to Etihad Airways where a passenger on an international
flight was stabbed by a hypodermic needle in a seatback pouch).
127 Etihad Airways, 870 F.3d at 434.
128 See id. at 433–34.
129 Azi Paybarah, Passenger Who Had Medical Emergency on Flight Died of Covid-19,
Coroner Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/22/
us/united-airlines-covid-death-lax.html [https://perma.cc/95KM-N23E].
126
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courts may be forced into a policy-making role even as they
strive only to strictly interpret the law.
In fairness, reasonable arguments exist in both directions for
allowing mental anguish claims arising from international
flights to proceed. These sorts of debates and tradeoffs are not
themselves unusual or unexpected. In addition, passengers like
those in Saks, Husain, and Etihad Airways are sympathetic claimants. The carriers involved in those suits almost certainly should
have and could have responded differently and better. However,
as detailed below, assessing liability in the context of infectious
diseases lacks a cohesive approach. The time may be at hand to
reform the Conventions to spare courts and litigants of line
drawing exercises that run afoul of the goal of unification rules
for the international carriage by air.
IV.

DISCUSSION

Having explained the interpretative framework established by
Saks and Husain for generally assessing air carrier liability for an
“accident” under the Conventions, this Part explores whether a
claim arising from the alleged transmission or contraction of an
infectious disease like COVID-19 would (or should) fall within
the requirements of the Conventions as the sort of external, unexpected, or unusual happening or event that gives rise to strict
liability of an air carrier engaged in international commercial
air carriage. One troubling pattern becomes apparent in this
analysis: courts inclined and disinclined to find an “accident”
under either the Warsaw Convention or Montreal Convention
seem on equal footing, and the seminal cases command no obviously correct result on air carrier liability in the international
carriage. Avoiding a case-by-case determination of cases under
the Conventions may be unavoidable, but the need for revision
is also patent if uniform and predictable results are to happen.
A.

INFECTION

AS AN

EXPECTED, UNEXPECTED, USUAL,
UNUSUAL EVENT

AND

In the absence of controlling authority or specific legal guidance on the matter, the question of air carrier liability for the
transmission of an infectious disease like COVID-19 turns on the
judicially constructed definition of “accident” under Saks.130 But
how exactly Saks might apply to litigation based on the spread of
130

See generally Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
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COVID-19 or any other infectious disease whose transmission
dynamics are still being studied is unclear. On the one hand,
courts could read Saks narrowly to mean that the risk of contracting an infectious disease is not caused by “an unexpected or
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.”131 Under this view, injuries associated with communicable
diseases would represent a passenger’s internal reaction to an
aircraft’s usual, normal, and expected operation. However,
courts could just as easily read disease transmission as falling
within Article 17 by focusing not on an “injury producing event”
like contraction but on “multiple interrelated factual events that
combine to cause any given injury.”132
First, the analytical framework established in Saks for adjudicating an “accident” suggests that, presuming normal operation
of an aircraft, claims closely tied to a passenger’s physiology or
health almost always will fall (and should fall) outside of the ambit of Article 17 of the Conventions. The particular facts of Saks
demonstrate why. There, the passenger-plaintiff flew from Paris
to Los Angeles without incident.133 As the airplane descended,
however, Valerie Saks felt severe pressure and pain in her left
ear—pain that continued after the airplane landed.134 Saks did
not inform any crewmember or carrier employer of her ailment.135 Five days after the flight, a doctor confirmed that Saks
had become permanently deaf in that ear.136 She sued (under
the Warsaw Convention), “alleging that her hearing loss was
caused by negligent maintenance and operation of the jetliner’s
pressurization system.”137 However, according to the Supreme
Court, she was entitled to no relief because her condition represented her internal reaction to the normal and expected operation of the aircraft (i.e., normal cabin pressure change).138 This
result is stunning for its denial of a remedy to a passenger whose
injury indisputably related to her experiences on board an aircraft in international carriage, and by extension, lends support
to the general idea that allegations of either contraction or
transmission of an illness, no matter the severity, fail to meet the
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 392.
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 653 (2004).
Saks, 470 U.S. at 394.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 406.
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definition of an “accident” under the Conventions because they
involve a passenger’s internal reaction to the usual, normal, or
expected operation of an aircraft.
On the transmission side of the ledger, for example, scientific
literature details how using HEPA filters by air carriers offers
exceptional, hospital-grade protection against the transmission
of viruses.139 So much so that, according to major airlines, the
transmission of viral particles aboard modern aircraft is unexpected and unusual (assuming their normal operation).140 In
fact, since the late 1970s, only three studies of in-flight transmission of the flu have been reported, and there have been no reported influenza outbreaks aboard commercial aircraft since
1999.141 Given existing and historic controls on the transmission
of viruses aboard aircraft, Saks encourages the conclusion that a
passenger’s contraction of an illness would be unexpected and
unusual in the routine operation of modern aircraft, and consequently, fall outside the definition of “accident” under the
Conventions.
Alternatively, even with fully functioning HEPA filters, the
cabins of modern jetliners are regarded by many as “veritable
incubator[s] of potential disease.”142 Indeed, anecdotal evidence has long correlated catching cold- or flu-like symptoms
with the cabin air quality and ventilation in commercial aircraft,
and data-driven research has suggested that the risk of contracting an upper respiratory tract infection while aboard an aircraft is as high as 20% or 113 times greater than the normal
139 E.g., Michael Laris, Scientists Know Ways to Help Stop Viruses from Spreading on
Airplanes. They’re Too Late for this Pandemic, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/scientists-think-theyknow-ways-to-combat-viruses-on-airplanes-theyre-too-late-for-this-pandemic/
2020/04/20/83279318-76ab-11ea-87da-77a8136c1a6d_story.html [https://
perma.cc/AE2N-MKS5].
140 See id.
141 See, e.g., K. Leder & D. Newman, Respiratory Infections During Air Travel, 35
INTERNAL MED. J. 50, 52, 54 (2005). The first occurred in 1979, when 72% of all
passengers aboard an airliner contracted the influenza A/Texas strain within 72
hours—a transmission rate attributed to a three-hour period during which passengers were kept aboard an aircraft with an inoperative ventilation system while
repair work was being done. The second study involved the transmission of influenza A/Tawan/1/86 (H1N1) infections at a naval station and aboard two aircraft
transporting a squadron from Puerto Rico to a Florida naval station. The third
outbreak happened in 1999 on a 75-seat aircraft carrying mine workers. See id.;
Scott McCartney, Where Germs Lurk on Planes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2011), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204058404577108420985863872
[https://perma.cc/WJJ9-NZ8N].
142 Clegg, supra note 51, at 450 (alteration in original).
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daily ground-level transmission rate.143 Notwithstanding this
heightened risk—a risk factor that seems to be well known by
the traveling public—consumers do not avoid flying.144 Instead,
they utilize commercial air transportation in record numbers.145
Moreover, not all aircraft have HEPA filters, and the fact that
ventilation systems do not function on the ground without engine or auxiliary power or function more slowly than when an
aircraft is airborne is no secret.146 Arguably, then, the potential
transmission and contraction of an illness in this context is
somewhat expected and usual compared to other transportation
modalities or ground-based settings—a fact mitigating against a
finding of an “accident” or air carrier liability under the Conventions relative to disease transmission aboard aircraft.
Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has generated acute public
awareness of the potential (however probable or improbable)
transmission or contraction of viruses aboard aircraft.147 Therefore, courts may regard disease transmission aboard aircraft not
as an unexpected or unusual event or happening but rather as
part of a new normal associated with the operation of aircraft in
an ever-increasingly interconnected world. In either case—
whether a disease is regarded as an expected or usual risk associated with international flight or not—finding that passenger
lawsuits arising from the contraction of communicable disease
constitute an “accident” that gives rise to air carrier liability is
not compelled by the text or purposes of the Conventions as
construed by the Supreme Court in Saks.

143 Martin B. Hocking & Harold D. Foster, Common Cold Transmission in Commercial Aircraft: Industry and Passenger Implications, 3 J. ENV’T HEALTH RSCH. 7, 8–9
(2004).
144 See, e.g., TSA Checkpoint Travel Numbers (Current Year Versus Prior Year(s)/Same
Weekday), TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/coronavirus/passengerthroughput [https://perma.cc/447L-D272].
145 See, e.g., id.
146 See, e.g., Scott McCartney, The Key to Safe Airflow for Planes Before Takeoff,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2021, 8:56 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-key-tosafe-airflow-for-planes-before-takeoff-11617800215 [https://perma.cc/HRL5QHQ3].
147 See, e.g., Sophie Bushwick, Tanya Lewis & Amanda Montañez, Evaluating
COVID Risk on Planes, Trains and Automobiles, SCI. AM. (Nov. 19, 2020), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/evaluating-covid-risk-on-planes-trains-andautomobiles2/ [https://perma.cc/K5VD-X6DC].
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CAUSES”

Concluding that the transmission of an infectious disease
does not by itself constitute an “accident” does not end the liability analysis under the Conventions.148 Indeed, as Husain highlighted, the relevant question for assessing liability under the
Conventions may not be whether or not the possibility of catching COVID-19 or some other infectious disease is an expected or
usual event or happening, but rather whether or not some unexpected and unusual action or inaction constitutes a link in the
chain of causes to constitute an “accident.”149
Framing the issue of “accident” in this way, the potential liability for air carriers relative to the transmission of infectious disease is vast. Although a plaintiff-passenger avoids becoming
enmeshed in establishing the precise factual producing event
that caused the injury, they do so at the cost of exposing an air
carrier to liability for any one of multiple interrelated factual
events or happenings that may be a link in the chain of causes
that is unusual or unexpected.150 In other words, passengers
need only come forward with “any injury” and proof of “a link in
the chain” that constitutes an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger.151 To be sure, this approach originated
in Saks, which explained:
Any injury is the product of a chain of causes, and we require
only that the passenger be able to prove that some link in the
chain was an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger. Until Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention is changed by
the signatories, it cannot be stretched to impose carrier liability
for injuries that are not caused by accidents.152

From this language, within the context of the specific factual
scenario of an asthmatic who died following a flight attendant’s
apparent refusal to reseat him away from smoking passengers,
the Husain court reasoned:
[F]ocus on the ambient cigarette smoke as the injury producing
event is misplaced. We do not doubt that the presence of ambient cigarette smoke in the aircraft’s cabin during an international flight might have been “normal” at the time of the flight in
question. But petitioner’s “injury producing event” inquiry—
148
149
150
151
152

See generally Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650–52 (2004).
Id. at 651–52.
See id. at 653.
Id.
Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 406 (1985) (emphasis added).
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which looks to “the precise factual ‘event’ that caused the injury”—neglects the reality that there are often multiple interrelated
factual events that combine to cause any given injury. In Saks, the
Court recognized that any one of these factual events or happenings may be a link in the chain of causes and—so long as it is
unusual or unexpected—could constitute an “accident” under
Article 17. Indeed, the very fact that multiple events will necessarily combine and interrelate to cause any particular injury makes
it difficult to define, in any coherent or non-question-begging
way, any single event as the “injury producing event.”153

Taken together, Saks and Husain open the possibility that air
carriers could be liable for a broad range of potential claims
centered not only on their affirmative actions but also on their
failures to take certain action(s)—”inaction” in the parlance of
Husain.154
Applying Saks and Husain to the specific scenario of an infectious disease aboard an aircraft, liability may lie in the circumstance that an air carrier fails to implement (or defectively
implements) precautionary measures such as pre-flight testing
or other procedures during the embarking and disembarkation
phases of flight. Strict liability may also lie where an air carrier
fails to decline boarding an ill passenger, refuses to reseat an
apparently healthy (or asymptomatic) passenger away from another passenger exhibiting symptoms, or neglects to properly
administer tests designed to distinguish sick passengers from
healthy ones. In addition, the Saks-Husain framework establishes
an important predicate for imposing legal fault if a passenger
contracts a communicable disease due to an air carrier’s failure
to comply with industry regulations or standards or failure to
conform with industry practices and customs.155 In addition,
courts may characterize the failure of an air carrier (or its agents
or subcontractors) to sanitize its aircraft to be an unusual and
unexpected act or omission that forms a link in the causative
chain.156 Poor air cabin quality caused by an improperly functioning aircraft air filtration system also may give rise to liability
notwithstanding the observations in Part III.A, that the spread of
Husain, 540 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
See id. at 654–56.
155 E.g., Aziz v. Air India Ltd., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2009);
Watts v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-0434, 2007 WL 3019344, at *1, *4 (S.D.
Ind. Oct. 10, 2007).
156 See Waxman v. C.I.S. Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. De C.V., 13 F. Supp. 2d
508, 510, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
153
154
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infectious disease aboard aircraft is sometimes both an unexpected and unusual event.
In all, according to the language of the Conventions and the
relevant decisional law interpreting Article 17, what drives the
definition of “accident” is “the cause of the infection, not the
infection itself.”157 While the law in this regard gives passengers
and creative aviation practitioners great latitude in devising
claims, along with a low pleading threshold (e.g., “any injury . . .
some link in the chain”), it also begs the question of where
courts should draw the proverbial line and limit airline liability
along a nearly endless continuum of possible times, places, and
events that are unexpected or unusual.158
157 Eman Naboush & Raed Alnimer, Air Carrier’s Liability for the Safety of Passengers During COVID-19 Pandemic, 89 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 1, 2 (2020). Notably,
courts have held that injuries that aggravate pre-existing conditions are not considered “accidents” absent proof of abnormal external factors. E.g., Abramson v.
Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1984) (hernia and thrombophlebitis condition aggravated by sitting in an airline seat during normal flight not an
accident); MacDonald v. Air Can., 439 F.2d 1402, 1404–05 (5th Cir. 1971).
158 Article 17 differentiates between injuries that “took place on board the aircraft” as opposed to “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.” Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 17. While “on board the
aircraft” is self-explanatory, neither of the Conventions defines the phrase “embarking or disembarking,” leaving courts and litigants to fill the analytical void
just as they must with respect to the word “accident.” In construing the phrase
“embarking or disembarking,” some courts have held that the text of the Conventions imagines that air carrier liability extends to areas outside the aircraft. See
Naboush & Alnimer, supra note 157, at 3. How far beyond “on board the aircraft”
an unusual or unexpected event or happening that is external to the passenger
must occur to constitute an “accident” is unclear, however. But, at a minimum,
the language of Article 17 theoretically supports the view that embarkation may
start as far away as the ticket counter in an airport.
One of the leading cases to interpret Article 17 in terms of embarkation is Day
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 528 F.2d
31 (2d Cir. 1975), which centered on personal injury claims by international passengers who were injured during a terrorist attack in the lounge of an airport in
Greece. The air carrier argued that when the attack occurred the plaintiff-passengers were not in the course of any of the operations of embarking as that phrase
is understood under the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 220. The court disagreed,
concluding that the terrorist activities in the circumstances of the case indisputably constituted an “accident” as a matter of law. Id. In addition, the court found
that the condition of embarkation was satisfied. Id. at 223.
More specifically, the Day court employed a flexible, tripartite test in holding
that passengers were engaged in the operations of embarking, rejecting a narrow,
location-based test and instead focusing on three factors: (1) activity (what the
plaintiffs were doing); (2) control (at whose direction); and (3) location. Id. at
222; Naboush & Alnimer, supra note 157, at 3. In this context, the court set out
11 distinct steps that constituted embarkation, including presenting their tickets
at the checking desk; obtaining boarding passes and baggage checks from the
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Indeed, as Parts III.C and III.D explain, in the COVID-19 era,
the Saks-Husain framework risks imposing duties on air carriers
that they have never been expected to manage until now and
may be unqualified to meet (e.g., monitoring or policing passenger health). Stated otherwise, and as explored in Part IV.C,
holding air carriers accountable for the transmission of infectious disease may be consistent with the philosophy of the Conventions to obtain equitable compensation and restitution for
passengers for injuries sustained during international air travel,
but it also might stretch the Conventions beyond their purpose
of harmonizing private international air law and into the realm
of public health and safety.
C.

IS DISEASE

AN

INHERENT CHARACTERISTIC

OF

AIR TRAVEL?

Apart from the fundamental and persistent problem of how
to define “accident” under the Conventions is the vexing question of whether the transmission of infection from an asymptomatic passenger (or crewmember) to a fellow passenger
constitutes an “accident” for which air carriers are liable. The
issue is not an easy one because Saks did not make “clear
whether an event’s relationship to the operation of an aircraft is
relevant to whether the event is an ‘accident.’ ”159 As such, courts
airline; obtaining a seat number from the airline; passing through passport and
currency control imposed by governmental authorities, as well as submitting to a
search for explosives and weapons; submitting carry-on baggage to security officials; and walking through the designated gate to the aircraft. Day, 393 F. Supp. at
221.
Problematically, and as the Day court itself recognized, the tripartite test invites
inconsistent line drawing. Id. at 222. Courts that view embarkation as beginning
as early at the airport risk imposing an outsized burden on carriers to avoid liability in locations operated by third parties and over which the carrier has no control—essentially holding an air carrier responsible is a passenger contracts a
disease at innumerable points between the check-in counter and the aircraft.
Naboush & Alnimer, supra note 157, at 3. Consequently, several authors have
suggested that the control and location test be applied in tandem:
Applying these tests together will eliminate air carrier’s liability if
the accident takes place in locations which are operated by a third
party and the carrier have no control over. For example, inside the
aircraft, boarding gate, the check in point one may expect the carrier to have the ability to control and disinfect. On the other hand,
escalators, and the area between the checking in zone and the
boarding gate are used by other carriers and other users, therefore,
the carrier will not have control over them.
Id.
159 Gezzi v. Brit. Airways PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam).
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have struggled to apply the Saks definition of “accident” where
the alleged injuries are caused by torts committed by fellow passengers—the likeliest path for the transmission of infectious disease aboard aircraft.
In one camp, courts have construed “accident” under Article
17 narrowly to mean an event that must arise from “such risks
that are characteristic of air travel.”160 For example, courts have
ruled that terrorist attacks161 and hijackings162 are “accidents,”
whereas physical fighting between passengers is not.163 Moreover, in the lower court decisions cited with approval in Saks, all
of the passenger injuries arose out of risks inherent to air travel
or the operation of the aircraft. In fact, only after extensive discovery established that the aircraft’s pressurization system had
operated in the usual manner did the district court in Saks hold
that no “accident” had occurred.164 In this context, courts may
be unlikely to characterize the transmission of an infectious disease aboard an aircraft (or in the course of embarking or disembarking an aircraft) as an “accident” absent some abnormal
operation of the aircraft itself (e.g., failure to operate an air filtration system or carrying out procedures or operations in an
unreasonable manner).
Other courts have read “accident” broadly.165 For example, in
Barratt v. Trinidad & Tobago Airways Corp., a New York federal
district court reasoned that:
In Air France v. Saks, . . . the Supreme Court held that an “accident,” for purposes of Article 17, is an injury caused by “an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
160 Stone v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 823, 824, 827 (D. Haw. 1995)
(airline passenger who was punched without provocation by another passenger
had averred no accident because it was not “derived from air travel”); Price v.
Brit. Airways, No. 91 Civ. 4947, 1992 WL 170679, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1992) (an
injury caused by a fistfight between two passengers was not an “accident” because
“a fracas is not a characteristic risk of air travel nor may carriers easily guard
against such a risk through the employment of protective security measures”); see
also Curley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
161 E.g., Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 154 (3d Cir.
1977) (en banc).
162 Krystal v. Brit. Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322, 1323–24 (C.D.
Cal. 1975).
163 E.g., Stone, 905 F. Supp. at 824, 827; see also Price, 1992 WL 170679, at *3 (“a
fracas is not a characteristic risk of air travel nor may carriers easily guard against
such a risk through . . . protective security measures.”).
164 See Saks v. Air Fr., 724 F.2d 1383, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984).
165 Barratt v. Trin. & Tabago (BWIA Int’l) Airways Corp., No. CV 88-3945, 1990
WL 127590, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990).
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passenger.” This definition is in no way limited to those injuries resulting from dangers exclusive to aviation. [Article 17] itself limits liability for accidents, not by reference to risks inherent in aviation,
but by whether they occur “on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”166

Under this sweeping reading of Saks and Article 17, liability
could attach to an air carrier for injuries caused by co-passenger
torts, regardless of whether they arose from a characteristic risk
of air travel or not.167 To the extent that disease transmission is a
characteristic risk of air travel, then claims by infected passengers would fit within this line of precedent.
Wallace v. Korean Air may be the most influential decision in
this regard. There, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided
that an air carrier was liable after one of its passengers sexually
assaulted another passenger in an adjacent seat.168 Noting the
language in Saks that the “definition [of accident] should be
flexibly applied” after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger’s injuries,169 the Wallace court found that
“the characteristics of air travel increased [the passenger’s] vulnerability to [ ] assault.”170 “When Ms. Wallace took her seat in
economy class on the KAL flight, she was cramped into a confined space beside two men she did not know, one of whom
turned out to be a sexual predator.”171 Therefore, the assault
she experienced was, “in the language of Saks, ‘an unexpected
or unusual event or happening that [was] external to the
passenger.’ ”172
Wallace arguably offers an analogy for holding air carriers liable for passenger-to-passenger (and perhaps crew-to-passenger)
disease transmission. After all, social distancing is not an option
in an airplane. Some scientific research suggests that international flights pose a greater risk of spreading infectious disease
than flights of shorter distance and duration (e.g., less than 1.25
hours).173 As such, courts may be persuaded that those “characteristics of [international] air travel” increase a passenger’s vulId. at *2.
Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2000).
168 Id. at 295, 300.
169 Id. at 298.
170 Id. at 299.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 300 (alteration in original).
173 See Marisa Moore, Karen S. Fleming & Lawrence Sands, A Passenger with
Pulmonary/Laryngeal Tuberculosis: No Evidence of Transmission on Two Short Flights,
67 AVIATION, SPACE, & ENV’T MED. 1097, 1100 (1996).
166
167
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nerability to infection just as the cramped nature of the
economy class on an international flight heightened the risk of a
passenger to an assault by sexual predators.174
That said, the reasoning of Wallace, and the analogy it potentially offers between its facts and the hypothetical scenarios of
virus transmission aboard aircraft at the center of this Article, is
not a perfect fit. First, as the concurring opinion in Wallace
noted, “[i]mposing an ‘inherent in air travel’ requirement [into
the Saks formulation] does not comport with the plain meaning
of” Saks as a co-passenger’s tort is an “accident” to the extent it is
“an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external
to the passenger.”175 Additionally, as a practical matter, unlike
the passenger in Wallace, passengers can anticipate and reduce
(if not eliminate) the risk of infectious disease either by not flying at all or complying with air carrier rules such as wearing a
face mask and following boarding procedures. Moreover, the
Wallace majority found “equally important” in its calculation that
“not a single flight attendant noticed a problem” during the extended time over which the sexual assault took place.176 Air carriers are comparatively more sensitized to the health risk aboard
flights today, such that an airline’s inattention to aircraft hygiene would be unusual or unexpected.177
D.

DAMAGES

AND

DEFENSES

Even if the transmission or contraction of an infectious disease like COVID-19 is somehow linked to a causative event and
otherwise satisfies all the foregoing predicates to liability (i.e., an
“accident” taking place “on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking”), damages
may be limited under the terms of both Conventions.
First, in the case of the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier
need only demonstrate that it took “all necessary measures to
avoid the damage or that it was impossible” to do so.178 Any or
all of the initial responses taken by carriers to stem the COVID19 pandemic—from requiring passengers to wear masks, to leavSee Wallace, 214 F.3d at 299.
Id. at 300 (Pooler, J., concurring).
176 Id. (majority opinion).
177 This presents its own problems. See, e.g., Hugo Martı́n, Ruckus in the Skies:
What Happens when Airline Passengers Refuse to Wear Masks, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2021,
3:10 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-05-05/airline-passengers-mask-rules-faa-fine-zero-tolerance [https://perma.cc/2V6U-GYTT].
178 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 20(1).
174
175
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ing middle seats open during the reservation process, to discontinuing in-flight service179—likely would satisfy this “necessary
measures” test.
Moreover, breaking the liability cap under the Warsaw Convention is especially difficult for claimants in general, and it
would be that and more in the context of infectious disease
transmission. After all, passenger-plaintiffs would need to establish an air carrier’s “wilful misconduct” to break the liability
cap.180 Such self-defeating behavior is difficult to imagine, given
the economic devastation that COVID-19 virus policies inflicted
on global airline travel. Of course, economic considerations may
always exist to deter carriers from taking costly steps to fortify
onboard health, and an air carrier’s decision not to invest or deploy antiviral technologies or procedures may well serve as the
foundation for a Husain-like claim. But, in the abstract, the concept that an air carrier would intentionally or willfully harm passengers who are already tentative about returning to
international travel that the COVID-19 virus decimated makes
little sense.
Finally, under the two-tier liability regime of the Montreal
Convention, claims for damages will confront air carriers’ powerful evidentiary headwinds and weighty defenses. First, there is
a strict liability tier under Article 21(1) up to 100,000 Special
Drawing Rights, which provides: “For damages arising under
paragraph 1 of Article 17 not exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Rights for each passenger, the carrier shall not be able to
exclude or limit its liability.”181 Next, Article 21(2) establishes:
The carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 to the extent that they exceed for each passenger 100,000 Special Drawing Rights if the carrier proves that:
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents; or (b)
such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful
act or omission of a third party.182
179 See, e.g., Laurie A. Garrow, The First 100 Days: How Airlines Responded to the
COVID-19 Crisis, AVIONICS INT’L (Aug./Sept. 2020), http://interactive.aviationtoday.com/avionicsmagazine/august-september-2020/the-first-100days-how-airlines-responded-to-the-covid-19-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/3ZYGHV2Y].
180 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 25(1).
181 Montreal Convention, supra note 14, art. 21(1).
182 Id. art. 21(2).
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While these provisions ostensibly advance the policy goal of
speeding settlement and facilitating recovery, both primarily
serve to qualify air carrier liability, and neither obviates the requirement that a passenger establish that an “accident” occurred. Moreover, Article 20 of the Montreal Convention
provides air carriers with a route toward exoneration even for
tier-one strict liability:
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused or contributed
to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the
person claiming compensation . . . the carrier shall be wholly or
partly exonerated from its liability to the claimant to the extent
that such negligence or wrongful act or omission caused or contributed to the damage.183

As such, air carriers can reduce or eliminate liability by establishing contributory negligence, for example, by establishing
that a passenger-plaintiff concealed an illness in order to fly or
refused or failed to follow the requirements of the carrier or
international health authorities like WHO (e.g., wearing a face
mask during the flight). Indeed, passengers are best positioned
and ultimately responsible for their own welfare. They can decide whether to conceal or deny illness or comply with air-carrier face mask requirements.
V.

CONCLUSION

Among the core aims of the Montreal Convention is the
“need to modernize and consolidate” earlier international liability schemes and to promote the “orderly development of international air transport operations and the smooth flow of
passengers, baggage and cargo in accordance with the principles and objectives”184 of the Chicago Convention of 1944, itself
a landmark post-war agreement drafted a dark time in human
history that “laid the foundation for the standards and procedures for peaceful global air navigation.”185 Given the existential
crises that the spread of the COVID-19 virus presented to the
global airline industry, the “smooth flow of passengers” is at risk.
Consequently, the time may once again be at hand to revise the
main instruments of private international air law to clarify pasId. art. 20.
Id. pmbl.
185 The History of ICAO and the Chicago Convention, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG.,
https://www.icao.int/about-icao/history/pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/
TSW7-E6XV].
183
184
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sengers’ rights and the obligations of air carriers in the new normal that emerges after global travel restrictions are lifted. As
one federal district court judge wrote more than four decades
ago:
Of course, when the Convention was drafted, we lived in a simpler day. Many airlines required nothing more than to weigh the
passenger and his luggage, take his ticket and allow him to place
his foot on the boarding ladder. The plain meaning of the treaty
must be adaptable to the practical exigencies of air travel in these
parlous times.186

Presently, however, the Conventions, as construed by the SaksHusain line of cases, seem maladapted to the risk of infectious
disease aboard aircraft in the international carriage.
Unhelpfully, under a present reading of Article 17 and the
precedent established by Saks, the judicially crafted definition of
“accident” is dizzying. A disease can constitute an expected, unexpected, usual, unusual, external, and internal event or happening on an airplane, in an airport, and at incalculable points
in between all at the same time.187 Despite the multivariate
causes of disease transmission, air carriers can be strictly liable
for “[a]ny injury [that] is the product of a chain of causes” and
passengers need only “be able to prove that some link in the
chain was an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger.”188 Article 17 can be read to include and exclude copassenger torts from the definition of “accident.”189 A circuit
split now exists given the Sixth Circuit’s decision to recognize
mental anguish claims asserting merely a “fear of contagion.”190
Meanwhile, Husain places U.S. law at odds with the interpretation of sister signatories essentially by making non-events actionable events.191
In all, courts are persistently confronted with “close question[s]”192 and line drawing exercises about which reasonable
people may differ widely.193 Such uncertainty and variability in
186 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
aff’d, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
187 See generally Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 395 (1985).
188 See id. at 406.
189 See id. at 405.
190 See Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 434 (6th Cir. 2017).
191 See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 667 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
192 See Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2000).
193 Compare, e.g., Husain, 540 U.S. at 653–54, with id. at 663 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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result is at odds with the goal of uniformity undergirding the
Conventions. As such, while liability can and should lie against
air carriers pursuant to the Warsaw Convention and Montreal
Convention for the transmission of infectious disease where the
operation of an airplane is not “normal” (e.g., the failure of an
air filtration system), courts, as a normative matter, should construe Article 17 to exonerate air carriers where passengers are
contributorily negligent. A fortiori, courts should resist the invitation to engraft new requirements of air carriers within the
phrase “operations of embarking and disembarking” that are attenuated from the inherent risks characteristic of air travel. Indeed, requiring air carriers to police the health of passengers,
undertake costly cabin reconfigurations, or deploy antiviral
technologies as part of their “normal” operations as a matter of
law is not supported by the Conventions. In other words,
onboard health may be at the same level as flight safety for liability purposes under the international rules for the international
carriage by air. However, in the absence of textual clarity to the
contrary, courts should be reticent to hold airlines accountable
for the spread of infectious diseases in the international
carriage.

